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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary Of The Case. 
This is an unusual appeal because the judgment being appealed - which was prepared by 
Plaintiffs and has not been appealed by them - grants Defendants/Appellants the very relief 
requested in their answer: that Plaintiffs' complaint be dismissed with prejudice. Thus, neither 
Defendants nor Plaintiffs contest the terms of the judgment under appeal, although Defendants 
do contest the award of attorney fees and costs to Plaintiffs, whose complaint was dismissed with 
prejudice. 
Yet this appeal was taken by Defendants not only to overturn the award of fees and costs 
to Plaintiffs, but in order to avoid additional litigation in the district court and appeals in this 
Court, to also overturn the district court's ruling on which its determination that Plaintiffs 
prevailed in this lawsuit is based: that the Undivided Right of First Refusal to Acquire Interest in 
Real Property attached hereto as Exhibit A (the "ROFR") was "extinguished" upon its 
assignment by one of the two Defendants to the other. In this regard, the district court's ruling 
that the ROFR was extinguished is erroneous for at least the following three independent 
reasons: 
• The ROFR is an unambiguous stand-alone contract that is reasonably interpreted 
as being assignable without resort to parol evidence. 
• Even if the assignment of the ROFR were a nullity, that would not affect the 
validity of the ROFR between the contracting parties. 
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• The ROFR is not appurtenant to a separate parcel of a real property that was sold 
by the grantors of the ROFR to its named beneficiary. 
B. Summary Of The Proceedings In The District Court. 
Plaintiffs filed their verified complaint initiating this civil action on June 29, 2016. [R, p. 
2.] Defendants filed a joint answer to the complaint on July 22, 2016. [R, p. 2.] No amended or 
other pleadings were filed by any party to this lawsuit. 
Plaintiffs moved for the entry of partial summary judgment on August 22, 2016 [R., p. 3], 
a month after the answer was filed and without any party propounding discovery, and the motion 
was heard on September 22, 2016 [R, p. 3]. By its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed November 10, 2016 ("1st MSJ Decision"), the 
district court granted Plaintiffs summary judgment, holding, in part, that "[t]he ROFR was 
extinguished when Canyon Cove [Development Company, LLP] assigned the ROFR and 
conveyed its interest in the neighboring property to Burns [Concrete, Inc.]" [R, pp. 47 & 61.] 
Because neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants had previously raised or addressed the question 
of whether the ROFR might have been "extinguished" upon its assignment to Bums Concrete, 
Inc., Defendants presented the legal authorities establishing why the ROFR was not extinguished 
upon its assignment by a motion for reconsideration filed December 30, 2016. [R, p. 4.] The 
district court denied Defendants' motion by the court's Memorandum Decision and Order Re: 
Motion for Reconsideration, filed March 20, 2017 ("2nd MSJ Decision"), again holding that 
"Canyon Cove's rights under the ROFR have been extinguished." [R, pp. 73 & 92.] 
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Plaintiffs then moved to dismiss all of their remaining claims by motion filed April 25, 
2017 [R, p. 5], which was granted by the district court's order dismissing, with prejudice, 
Plaintiffs' remaining claims as moot filed April 27, 2017 [R, p. 94]. Also on April 27, 2017, the 
district court entered its Judgment, ordering that "all pending matters in the above entitled case 
are hereby dismissed, with prejudice." [R, p. 96.] 
Defendants filed their notice of appeal on June 5, 2017 [R, p. 98], under and pursuant to 
I.A.R. l l(a)(l) with respect to an appeal from a final judgment and within the 42-day period 
required by I.AR. 14(a). 
Notwithstanding entry of the district court's order and Judgment dismissing all of 
Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice, Plaintiffs moved for an award of their costs and attorney fees 
on May 10, 2017 [R, p. 5], with the district court granting Plaintiffs their attorney fees and costs 
by the court's Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Attorney Fees and Costs, filed July 27, 
2017 [R, pp. 102 & 112]. 
Finally, on August 2, 2017, Defendants filed their Amended Notice of Appeal to 
designate within the scope of this appeal the district court's grant of attorney fees and costs to 
Plaintiffs and to include copies of the district court's Judgment and Order granting attorney fees 
and costs. [R, p. 115-33.] 
No appeal or cross-appeal of the Judgment was filed by Plaintiffs. 
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C. Summary Of The Facts. 1 
(i) Parties. 
1. Plaintiff Nora A. Mulberry ("Mulberry") is a resident of Bonneville Country and 
the sole owner of Plaintiff TN Properties LLC ("TN Properties"), an Idaho limited liability 
company. Complain/ ,i 1 [R, p. 8]; Answer3 ,i 1 [R, p. 35]. 
2. Defendant Bums Concrete, Inc. ("Burns Concrete"), an Idaho corporation, has its 
principal place of business in Bonneville County. Complaint ,i 3 [R, p. 9]; Answer ,i 1 [R, p. 35]. 
3. Defendant Canyon Cove Development Company, LLP ("Canyon Cove"), an 
Idaho limited liability partnership, also has its principal place of business in Bonneville County. 
Complaint ,i 4 [R, p. 9]; Answer ,i 1 [R, p. 35]. 
(ii) Jurisdiction and Venue. 
4. Jurisdiction exists in the district court under Idaho Code Sections 10-1201, et seq. 
Complaint ,i 6 [R, p. 9]; Answer ,i 1 [R, p. 35]. 
5. Venue exists in Bonneville County. Complaint ,i 5 [R, p. 9]; Answer ,i 1 
[R, p. 35]. 
(iii) Material Terms of the ROFR. 
6. The terms of the ROFR include the following material provisions: 
1 Hereinafter referred to as Facts. 
2 Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, filed June 29, 2016 ("Complaint") [R, 
pp. 8-34]. 
3 Answer, filed July 22, 2016 ("Answer") [R, pp. 35-40]. 
-4-
?'811.00' i817 7998-8ll)7vl 
For adequate consideration, Sellers hereby grant to the 
Buyer a right of first refusal to acquire the Sellers' undivided 
interest in and to the real property hereafter described on the same 
terms, conditions, and provisions as the Sellers might intend to sell 
and convey said interest to any third person hereafter. 
Should the Sellers hereafter intend to sell in good faith and 
convey said premises they will first offer the same to the Buyer by 
a written notice containing all of the terms, conditions, and 
provisions by which they intend to sell in good faith the same to 
said third person. Buyer shall then have five (5) days from the date 
such notice is received to accept or refuse said offer. 
Should the Buyer decline the offer, and the sale to the third 
party, for any reason not occur, then this option of first refusal 
should then be renewed and shall apply to any subsequent sale to a 
third party. 
* * * 
This option agreement may be recorded in Bonneville County, 
Idaho. Thereafter, Sellers may record a notice in Bonneville 
County, Idaho, showing the date on which they gave their notice to 
Buyers, in order to give record notice of the beginning of the stated 
notice time period. 
Complaint Ex. 5 at ,i,i 1-4 (emphasis added) [R, p. 27]. Thus, the ROFR is a stand-alone contract 
that does not refer to any other transaction or property, states that it is based on adequate 
consideration, provides for its renewal or continuation in the event the encumbered property is 
not sold, and provides for notices to be given through recordation in the real property records -
which together establish that the ROFR was intended to bind both Mulberry and her property. 
(iv) General Allegations. 
7. On or about January 26, 1999, Mulberry and her now deceased husband, 
Theodore E. Mulberry, entered into a purchase and sale agreement (the ''PSA") for the sale of 
-5-
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certain Bonneville County real property to Canyon Cove (the "Purchased Property"). Complaint 
,r 9 and Ex. 3 [R, pp. 9 & 17-19]; Answer ,11 [R, p. 35]. 
8. The terms of the PSA were amended by an addendum entered into at the closing 
on the Purchased Property held March 18, 1999, which addendum provided for, among other 
things, the grant of the ROFR with respect to certain additional Bonneville County real property 
then owned by Mulberry and her now deceased husband (the "ROFR Property"). Complaint 
,r 10 and Ex. 4 [R, pp. 9 & 20-25]; Answer ,r 2 [R, pp. 35-36]. 
9. The ROFR was also entered into on March 18, 1999, by Mulberry and her now 
deceased husband, as the defined "Sellers" of the ROFR Property, and Canyon Cove, as the 
defined "Buyer" of the ROFR Property. Complaint ,r,r 10-11 and Ex. 5 [R, pp. 9-10 & 26-30]; 
Answer ,r 2 [R, pp. 35-36]. 
10. The ROFR was recorded by the Bonneville County Recorder on March 19, 1999, 
thereby encumbering the ROFR Property. Complaint ,r 11 and Ex. 5 [R, pp. 10 & 27]; Answer 
,I 3 [R, p. 36]. 
11. On March 30, 1999, Canyon Cover assigned its interest in the ROFR and a farm 
lease with respect to the Purchased Property to Bums Concrete. Complaint ,r 12 and Ex. 6 
[R, pp. 10 & 31-34]; Answer ,14 [R, p. 36]. 
12. Canyon Cove also conveyed the Purchased Property to Bums Concrete by deed 
executed March 30, 1999, and subsequently recorded by the Bonneville County Recorder. 2d 
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Burns Ajf.4 ,r 2 and Ex. A [R, pp. 63-64 & 67-69]. Thus, Burns Concrete acquired from Canyon 
Cove the Purchased Property, the landlord's interest in the farm lease of the Purchased Property, 
and the ROFR by instruments executed on March 30, 1999. Id. ,r,r 2-3 [R, pp. 63-64]. 
13. Burns Concrete's president, Kirk Burns, established the following undisputed 
facts concerning the location, condition, and current and prospective uses of both the Purchased 
Property and ROFR Property: 
72]. 
The Purchased Property is located between and adjacent to 
two additional parcels (one 50 acres and the other 35 acres) owned 
by Bums Concrete, with all of the Purchased Property being on the 
north side of 81st South (Cotton Road) in Bonneville County and 
with four residential properties constructed along 81 st South lying 
between it and the Purchased Property. 
The ROFR Property is located across the road from Burns 
Concrete's SO-acre parcel on the south side of 81st South and to 
the west of the Purchased Property. Thus, not only is the ROFR 
Property not in any manner adjacent or physically "connected" to 
(nor directly across the road from) the Purchased Property, but the 
two properties share no common irrigation system or other utilities, 
have no common means of ingress or egress, and are subject to no 
common easements or restrictions by which one of the properties 
benefits the other. For these reasons, there is no requirement for or 
benefit in the consistent use of the two properties, whether for 
farming, residential development, mining of aggregate materials, 
or otherwise. 
For the foregoing reasons, neither the value nor the use of 
the Purchased Property (or, for that matter, any of Burns 
Concrete's additional acreage) would in any manner be enhanced 
by Burns Concrete's ownership of the ROFR Property, nor would 
the Purchased Property otherwise be benefitted by common 
ownership of it and the ROFR Property. 
4 Second Affidavit of Kirk Burns, filed February 15, 2017 (" 2 d Burns A.ff.) [R, pp. 63-
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2d Burns A.ff. ~~ 4-7 ( emphasis in original) [R, pp. 64-65]. 
14. By deed rec9rded by the Bonneville County Recorder on August 17, 2005, 
Mulberry and her now deceased husband conveyed the ROFR Property to their wholly owned 
limited liability company, TN Properties, Complaint~~ 1 & 8 and Ex. 1 [R, pp. 8-9 & 13-14]; 
Answer~ 1 [R, p. 35]. 
15. At no time did either Canyon Cove or Bums Concrete receive written notice by 
anybody that either of them might purchase the ROFR Property. Wilkins Ajf.5 ~~ 1 & 3 [R, 
pp. 44-45] ; 1st Burns A.tr6 ~~ 1 & 3 [R, pp. 41-42]. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err in ruling that the ROFR was "extinguished" upon its 
assignment by Canyon Cove to Burns Concrete? 
2. Did the district court err in ruling that Plaintiffs were the prevailing parties and 
awarding them their attorney fees and costs? 
3. Are Defendants entitled to recover their attorney fees incurred on appeal pursuant 
to Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) and I.A.R. 41? 
III. LEGAL ST AND ARDS 
As provided by I.A.R. 17(e )(1 ), the appeal of a final judgment or order "shall be deemed 
to include, and present an appeal: (A) All interlocutory judgments and orders entered prior to the 
judgment, order or decree appealed from, and ... (C) All interlocutory or final judgments and 
5 Affidavit of Linda Wilkins, filed September 8, 2016 ("Wilkins A.ff.") [R, pp. 44-46]. 
6 Affidavit of Kirk Burns, filed September 8, 2016 ('' I st Burns A.ff" ) [R, pp. 41-43]. 
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orders entered after the judgment or order appealed from except [for certain inapplicable 
orders]." Further, this Court established in In re Estate of Keeven, 110 Idaho 452, 716, P.2d 
1224 (1986): 
If there is a final appealable order in a case and appeal is 
properly taken from that order, then all other orders which would 
otherwise not be appealable may be considered by this Court. 
Therefore, on remand, the trial court can be correctly advised on 
the law as it relates to all the issues of the case. Otherwise, much 
judicial time and resources may be wasted because the parties 
might have to take another appeal in order to test those same 
interlocutory orders which this Court could have decided when it 
decided the final appealable orders in the first appeal. 
Id. at 456-57, 716 P.2d 1228-29. 
Summary judgment is an appropriate remedy if the nonmoving party's "pleadings, 
affidavits, and discovery documents ... , read in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476, 50 P.3d 488, 491 (2002) 
(citing I.R.C.P. 56(c)). The Court must construe the evidence liberally and draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Hei V. Holzer, 139 Idaho 81, 84-85, 73 P.3d 94, 97-
98 (2003). If the facts, with inferences favorable to the nonmoving party, are such that 
reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions, summary judgment is not available. 
Hayward v. Jack 's Pharmacy Inc., 141 Idaho 622, 625, 115 P.3d 713, 716 (2005). The moving 
party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. 
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The present dispute arises out of the legal effect of the ROFR. The applicable standards 
with respect to this Court's construction of the ROFR are set forth in Knipe Land Company v. 
Robertson, 151 Idaho 449,259 P.3d 595 (2011), as follows: 
As provided by this Court in Potlatch Education Ass 'n v. 
Potlach School District No. 285: 
When interpreting a contract, this Court 
begins with the document's language. In the 
absence of ambiguity, the document must be 
construed in its plain, ordinary and proper sense, 
according to the meaning derived from the plain 
wording of the instrument. Interpreting an 
unambiguous contract and determining whether 
there has been a violation of that contract is an issue 
of law subject to free review. A contract term is 
ambiguous when there are two different reasonable 
interpretations or the language is nonsensical. 
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of 
law, but interpreting an ambiguous term is an issue 
of fact. 
Whether an ambiguity exists in a legal instrument is a 
question of law, over which this Court exercises free review. 
Where a legal instrument is found to be unambiguous the legal 
effect must be· decided by the district court as a matter of law; it is 
only when that instrument is found to be ambiguous that evidence 
as to the meaning of that instrument may be submitted to the finder 
of fact. "[E]vidence of custom or usage may not be introduced to 
vary or contradict the terms of a plain and unambiguous 
contract. ... " 
Knipe Land Co., id. at 454-55, 259 P.3d at 600-01 (emphasis added) (internal and concluding 
citations omitted). 
None of the parties asserted during this dispute that the ROFR is ambiguous and not 
subject to construction as a matter of a law. See also 1st MSJ Decision 12 ("The language of the 
-10-
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ROFR is plain and unambiguous.") [R, p. 58]. But cf 2nd MSJ Decision 17 ("Because the 
ROFR does not clearly indicate whether the parties intended the right to be appurtenant to the 
Purchased Property or in gross, the ROFR is ambiguous as to that issue.") [R, p. 90]. 
Finally, to the extent the interpretation of the Judgment is at issue, its interpretation "is 
generally subject to the same rules applicable to construction of contracts." McKoon v. 
Hathaway, 146 Idaho 106, 109, 190 P.3d 925,928 (Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The ROFR Remains A "Live" Contract Irrespective Of Whether It Constitutes An 
Appurtenant Option Agreement Or A Personal Contract. 
As its terms expressly provide, the ROFR was labeled by its parties to be an "option 
agreement" and intended to be recorded by the county recorder, Facts ~ 6, and thereupon 
encumber the ROFR Property. Further, relying on multiple sections in the RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES (2000) [hereinafter Restatement (Third)] the district court 
held the ROFR to be a servitude on the ROFR Property that ran with the land. 7 2nd MSJ 
Decision 12 ("the burden placed on Plaintiffs' property runs with the land") [R, p. 85]; id. at 14 
("the ROFR in this case runs with the land and is a servitude.") [R, p. 87]. 
7 Defendants do not contest this holding by the district court because the contracting 
parties treated the ROFR as running with the ROFR Property by characterizing the ROFR as an 
"option agreement," rather than as a personal contract or a preemptive right, by recording the 
ROFR against the ROFR Property, and by providing for the recording of notices given under the 
ROFR. Facts ~ 6. However, in reaching this holding the district court missed the particular 
point Defendants argued below: that the ROFR was not a servitude on the Purchased Property 
and didn't run with that land. 
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Notwithstanding the district court's holding the ROFR was a servitude on the ROFR 
Property that ran with the land and the court's reliance on, and quotation of, Restatement (Third) 
§ 1.5(3) ('"Personal' means that a servitude benefit or burden is not transferable and does not run 
with the land" (emphasis added)) in support of its holding,8 the district court also held that the 
ROFR was personal and could not be assigned to Bums Concrete. I st MSJ Decision 12 ("a 
declaratory judgment that the ROFR was personal to the parties and cannot benefit Burns 
Concrete should be granted.") [R, p. 58]. Defendants therefore submit that the district court's 
error in holding the ROFR has been "extinguished" is at least partly the result of confusion over 
the meaning and legal effect of the terms "appurtenant," "in gross," and "personal." 
Because Defendants have found no Idaho precedent articulating the relationship between 
"appurtenant," "in gross ," and "personal" as they may relate to a right of first refusal with respect 
to the purchase of land, Defendants will summarize these three concepts below utilizing the same 
principal authority relied upon by both Plaintiffs and the district court, the Restatement (Third). 
Before doing so, however, Defendants respectfully submit that there are but the following three 
alternative possibilities here in play, none of which support the conclusion that the ROFR was 
extinguished by its assignment to Burns Concrete: 
• If the ROFR is not "personal"to Canyon Cove, then Burns Concrete may exercise 
the ROFR irrespective of whether it is "appurtenant" to the Purchased Property, 
which Bums Concrete owns. 
8 See 2nd MSJ Decision 11 [R, p. 84] . 
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• If the ROFR is "personal" to Canyon Cove but not "appurtenant" to the Purchased 
Property, then Canyon Cove may exercise the ROFR if either (a) Canyon Cove's 
attempted assignment of the ROFR was void, or (b) if it was effective, Burns 
Concrete assigns the ROFR back to Canyon Cove by the deadline for its 
. 9 
exercise. 
• If the ROFR is both "personal" to Canyon Cove and "appurtenan..t'' to the 
Purchased Property, then Canyon Cove may exercise the ROFR if both (a) 
Canyon Cove's attempted assignment of the ROFR was void or, if it was 
effective, Burns Concrete assigns the ROFR back to Canyon Cove by the deadline 
for the ROFR'S exercise, and (b) Canyon Cove reacquires the Purchased Property 
by the deadline for the ROFR's exercise. 
In sum, irrespective of whether the ROFR is held to be personal to Canyon Cove or 
appurtenant to the Purchased Property, it may yet be exercised in accordance with each of its 
express and implied terms. And that the ROFR is not "extinguished" under such circumstances 
is made manifest by the fact that there is but one known state or federal opinion deciding that a 
legal contract may be held void while it may yet be exercised in accordance with all of its 
applicable terms - an outlier opinion discussed and distinguished in part A(iv) below that the 
district court itself ruled was "insufficient to conclude that a personal ROFR is extinguished 
upon its invalid assignment." 2ndMSJDecision 7 [R, p. 80]. 
9 1.e., within five days of Canyon Cove's receipt of written notice of the intended sale of 
the ROFR Property. Facts 16. 
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(i) The Definitions of and Relations Between "Appurtenant," "In Gross," and 
"Personal" as Adopted by the Restatement. 
The Restatement (I'hird) defines the terms "appurtenant," "in gross," and "personal" as 
follows: 
(1) "Appurtenant" means that the rights or obligations 
of a servitude are tied to ownership or occupancy of a particular 
unit or parcel of land. The right to enjoyment of an easement or 
profit, or to receive the performance of a covenant that can be held 
only by the owner or occupier of a particular unit or parcel, is an 
appurtenant benefit. A burden that obligates the owner or occupier 
of a particular unit or parcel in that person's capacity as owner or 
occupier is an appurtenant burden. 
(2) "In gross" means that the benefit or burden of a 
servitude is not tied to ownership or occupancy of a particular unit 
or parcel of land. 
(3) "Personal" means that a servitude benefit or burden 
is not transferable and does not run with land. Whether 
appurtenant or in gross, a servitude benefit or burden may be 
personal. 
Restatement (I'hird) § I .5 ( emphasis added). 
The relation between servitudes that are appurtenant, run with the land, and personal is 
explained in the comments to the foregoing section: 
Relation between appurtenant, running with land, and 
personal. Only appurtenant benefits and burdens run with land, 
but the terms are not synonymous. · Running with land means that 
the benefit or burden passes automatically to successors; 
appurtenant means that the benefit can be used only in conjunction 
with ownership or occupancy of a particular parcel of land, or that 
only the owner or occupier of a particular parcel is liable for failure 
to perform a servitude obligation. Appurtenant benefits and 
burdens ordinarily run with land, but they may be made personal to 
particular owners or occupiers of the land. 
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Restatement (I'hird) § 1.5 cmt. a (emphasis added). See also id. § 1.1 (l)(a) ("Running with land 
means that the right or obligation passes automatically to successive owners ... "). 
Or by the lexicon of the -Restatement (I'hird), a servitude that is personal and not 
transferable cannot run with the land because servitudes that run with the land pass automatically 
to successors in interest. Finally, and in addition to quoting the foregoing provisions and 
comment to the Restatement (I'hird) § 1.5 (albeit with different portions emphasized), the district 
court correctly noted that comment a to Restatement (I'hird) § 3.3 expressly provides that the 
rule stated in the section "applies to options and rights of first refusal with respect to the 
purchase ofland .... " 2d MSJ Decision 11-12 [R, pp. 84-85]. 
Accordingly, if this Court adopts the principles articulated in the foregoing provisions of 
the Restatement (I'hird) - and Defendants have found no Idaho precedent that conflicts with 
these general principles - then the ROFR here at issue should not be held to be a "personal" 
servitude if, as the district court held, it runs with the land. 
(ii) The ROFR Is Not Appurtenant to the Purchased Property. 
The undisputed facts in this case establish that the ROFR was entered into 19 years ago 
and recorded against the ROFR Property, Facts ~~ 9-1 O; and that shortly thereafter Bums 
Concrete acquired from Canyon Cove the Purchased Property, the landlord's interest in the farm 
lease of the Purchased Property, and the ROFR, Facts~~ 11-12. The undisputed facts further 
establish the following: 
• That the Purchased Property is located between and adjacent to two additional 
parcels (one 50 acres and the other 35 acres) owned by Burns Concrete, with all 
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of the Purchased Property being on the north side of 81 st South in Bonneville 
County and with four residential properties constructed along 81 st South lying 
between the road and the Purchased Property. Facts ,I 13. 
• That the ROFR Property is located across the road from Bums Concrete's 50-acre 
parcel on the south side of 81 st South and to the west of the Purchased Property. 
Id. 
• That not only is the ROFR Property not in any manner adjacent or physically 
"connected" to (nor directly across the road from) the Purchased Property, but the 
two properties share no common irrigation system or other utilities, have no 
common means of ingress or egress, and are subject to no common easements or 
restrictions by which one of the properties benefits the other - and for these 
reasons, there is no requirement for or benefit in the consistent use of the two 
properties, whether for farming, residential development, mining of aggregate 
materials, or otherwise. Id. 
• And that for all the foregoing reasons, neither the value nor the use of the 
Purchased Property (or, for that matter, any of Bums Concrete's additional 
acreage) would in any manner be enhanced by Bums Concrete's ownership of the 
ROFR Property, nor would the Purchased Property otherwise be benefitted by 
common ownership ofit and the ROFR Property. Id. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing uncontested facts, however, and without any other 
relevant facts pending before the district court, it held as follows: 
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Looking at the Restatement of Property - Servitudes[tOJ 
reinforces a finding that the ROFR was appurtenant to the 
Purchased Property. Though the properties are not contiguous, the 
proximity between the Purchased Property and the ROFR 
Property, makes the use of the ROFR Property arguably more 
useful to the owner of the Purchased Property than to an 
independent party who does not.own nearby property. While there 
may be room for doubt as to whether Canyon Cove or Burns might 
retain greater use of the ROFR Property after Canyon Cove's 
conveyance of the Purchased Property to Burns, such doubt is 
resolved in favor of construing the ROFR as being appurtenant. 
2nd MSJ Decision 18 (citations omitted) [R, p. 91]. 
There appears to be no opinion by either of Idaho's appellate courts expressly deciding 
when a right of first refusal will be deemed "appurtenant" or, conversely, "in gross.'' However, 
this Court has resorted to Idaho's law applicable to easements in deciding whether other rights 
related to property are one or the other. See, e.g., Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States of 
America, 144 Idaho 1, 13, 156 P.3d 502, 514 (2007) ("we reasoned by analogy from appurtenant 
easements, holding that water rights and easements were sufficiently similar to have the relevant 
law applicable to appurtenant easements apply to appurtenant water rights."). See also Oakley 
10 The established rule in Idaho with respect to unadopted provisions of the Restatement 
was quoted and followed by this Court in Asbury Park, LLC v. Greenbriar Estate Homeowners' 
Association, Inc., 152 Idaho 338,271 P.3d 1194 (2012): 
"The Restatement is not law unless it has been adopted by 
this Court." Estate of Skvorak v. Sec. Union Title Ins. Co., 140 
Idaho 16, 22, 89 P.3d 856, 862 (2004). "This Court will not adopt 
a Restatement provision if it is inconsistent with Idaho precedent, a 
different formulation resolved the issue, or the issue can be 
resolved by current Idaho law." Id. 
Asbury Park, 152 Idaho at 345, 271 P.3d at 1201. 
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Valley Stone, Inc. v. Alastra, 110 Idaho 265~ 268, 715 P.2d 935, 938 (1985) (comparing and 
contrasting easements and profits a prendre, which "may be either appurtenant or in gross."). 
(1991): 
As explained in Abbottv. Nampa School District No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 808 P.2d 1289 
The difference between an easement appurtenant and an easement 
"in gross" is summed up as follows: 
An easement ... "appurtenant" is one whose 
benefits serve a parcel of land. More exactly, it 
serves the owner of that land in a way that cannot 
be separated from his rights in the land. It in fact 
becomes a right in that land and, as we shall see, 
passes with the title. Typical examples of 
easements appurtenant are walkways, driveways, 
and utility lines across Blackacre, leading to 
adjoining or nearby Whiteacre. 
Easements . . . "in gross" are those whose 
benefits serve their holder only personally, not in 
connection with his ownership or use of any 
specific parcel of land. . . . Examples are easements 
for utilities held by utility companies, street 
easements, and railroad easements. 
Abbott, id. at 550, 808 P.2d at 1295 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
The requirement that an easement appurtenant serves an owner of land "in a way that 
cannot be separated from his rights in the land" is more fully explained in Hoch v. Vance, 155 
Idaho 636,315 P.3d 824 (2013): 
The Vances argue that the district court erred in finding that 
the easement Cridlebaugh reserved was an appurtenant easement 
because it does not benefit the dominant estate. There are two 
general types of easements: easements appurtenant and easements 
in gross. Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 230, 76 P.3d 969, 974 
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(2003). This Court has explained the difference between these two 
types of easements as· follows: · 
An easement appurtenant is a right to use a 
certain parcel, the servient estate, for the benefit of 
another parcel, the dominant estate. Essentially, an 
easement appurtenant serves the owner of the 
dominant estate in a way that cannot · be separated 
from his rights in the land. When an appurtenant 
easement is created, it becomes fixed as an 
appurtenance to the real property, which is subject 
to the prescriptive use arid may be claimed by a 
successor in interest. In contrast, an easement in 
gross benefits the holder of the easement personally, 
without connection to the ownership or use of a 
specific parcel of land. Thus, easements in gross do 
not attach to property. In cases of doubt, Idaho 
courts presume the easement is appurtenant. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
At the time Cridlebaugh reserved an easement over the 
upper road to the Hoch property, he was the owner of the Hoch 
property. The easement gave him access to his property. Thus, the 
easement's benefit to · Cridlebaugh was directly connected to his 
ownership or use of what is now the Hoch property. The district 
court did not err in holding that this easement was an appurtenant 
easement. 
Hoch, 155 Idaho at 639-40, 315 P.3d at 827-28 (emphasis added). 
Therefore, the ROFR Property here at issue cannot possibly be appurtenant to the 
Purchased Property under existing Idaho precedent because the ROFR Property is neither 
adjacent to nor in any manner connected to the use of the Purchased Property. Or stated in the 
language of Abbott and Hoch, the ROFR Property does not serve the owner of the Purchased 
Property in a way that cannot be separated from the owner's rights in the Purchased Property. 
See also Consolidation Coal Co. v. Mutchman, 565 N.E.2d 1074, 1083-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) 
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(analogizing from the law of easements to support its holding that right of first refusal included 
in subject mineral deeds "can only be interpreted as a right in gross as it expressly states it is 
given to the grantee, and it is not essentially necessary; nor does it benefitthe mineral estate."). 
Moreover, the opinion adopting and applying the Restatement (J'hird) on which the 
district court applies, Nature Conservancy of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Altnau, 756 N.W.2d 641 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 2008), was based on the Wisconsin court's finding that the right of first refusal there at 
issue "is particularly beneficial to a party owning one of the contiguous parcels, giving such an 
owner the option to preserve his or her hunting rights in the adjoining land." Id. at 648 
(emphasis added). The foregoing finding is, of course, wholly inconsistent with the undisputed 
facts in this lawsuit summarized above. 
Finally, it should be noted the court in Nature Conservancy did not hold that either the 
right of first refusal there at issue was "extinguished" or the rights of the assignors of the right 
(defendants Eugene and Marion McEssay) to defendant Altnau were "extinguished" as a result 
of the assignment, but merely that "[b]ecause the right of first refusal is appurtenant to land not 
owned by Altnau, he does not hold the right ... .'' Id. Indeed, the rights of the assignors of the 
right of first refusal (the McEssays, who continued as additional defendants in the litigation) 
were not decided in the opinion. Accordingly, the opinion in Nature Conservancy provides no 
support for the proposition that Canyon Cove's rights under the ROFR here at issue were 
extinguished by its assignment to Burns Concrete. 
(iii) Legal Principles Applicable to Rights of First Refusal and Their Assignment. 
-20-
21813.002\4817-7998-8827v3 
The general characteristics of rights of first refusal are summarized in American 
Jurisprudence, Second as follows: 
A right of first refusal creates a preemptive right in 
property, and it is the right to buy before or ahead of others. A 
"preemptive-right contract" is an agreement containing all the 
essential elements of a contract, the provisions of which give to the 
prospective purchaser the right to buy upon specified terms but 
only if the vendor decides to sell. It does not give to the pre-
emptioner the power to compel an unwilling owner to sell and, 
therefore, is distinguishable from an ordinary option. 
The right of first refusal limits a property owner's right to 
dispose freely of his or her property by compelling the property 
owner to offer it first to the party who has the first right to buy. 
The right of first refusal is in essence a "dormant option" to buy or 
lease property, which ripens into an option once an owner 
manifests a willingness to accept a good-faith offer. 
77 AM. JUR. 2D Vendor and Purchaser § 30 (Feb. 2018 update) (emphasis added) (footnotes 
omitted). "The vast majority of courts and commentators have held that rights of first refusal, 
which are commonly known as 'preemptive rights,' are interests in property ·and not merely 
contract rights." Ferrero Constr. Co. v. Dennis Rourke -Corp., 536 A.2d 1137, 1139 (Ct. App. 
Md. 1988) (citation omitted). This Court appears to stand firmly in the majority camp. 
Nicholson v. Coeur d 'Alene Placer Mining Corp. , 161 Idaho 877, 882-83, 392 P.3d 1218, 1223-
24 (2017) (applying the requirement for a precise legal description imposed by the statute of 
frauds to a right of first · refusal for the purchase of land); Meridian Bowling Lanes, Inc. v. 
Meridian Athletic Ass 'n, Inc., 105 Idaho 509, 51 F12, 670 P.2d 1294, 1296-97 (1983) (holding 
that "a preemptive right of first refusal .. . does not violate the absolute power of alienation of 
real property."). 
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The law with respect to the assignment of conditional rights is summarized as follows in 
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981) [hereinafter "Restatement (Second)"]: 
The fact that a right is created by an option contract or is 
conditional on the performance of a return promise or is otherwise 
conditional does n9t prevent its assignment before the condition 
occurs. 
Restatement (Second) § 3 20 ( 1981 ). Section 320 of the Restatement (Second) has been adopted 
by both of Idaho's appellate courts. Bonanza Motors, Inc., v. Webb, 104 Idaho 234, 236, 657 
P.2d 1102, 1104 (Ct App. 1983) ("An assignment properly may relate to a conditional right 
which is adequately identified." (citing Restatement (Second) § 320)); J.R. Simplot Co. v. W. 
Heritage Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 582, 585, 977 P.2d 196, 199 (1999) (quoting Bonanza Motors). 
Even so, and as explained in the comments to Section 320, certain conditional rights 
cannot be ''effectively" a~signed. Restatement (Second) § 320 cmt. a ("Of course the assignment 
may be ineffective if it mate_rially varies the obliger's duty .... See§ 317." 11 (emphasis added)). 
Or as stated in the comments. to Section 317, assignments that violate public policy may be 
11 Restatement (Second) § 317(2) .Provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
A contractual right can be assigned unless 
(a) the substitution of a right of the assignee for the right of the 
assignor would materially change the duty of the obligor, or materially increase 
the burden or risk imposed on him by his contract, or materially impair his 
chance of obtaining return performance, or materially reduce its value to him, or 
(b) the assignment is forbidden by statute or is otherwise inoperative 
on grounds or public policy, or 
(c) assignment is validly precluded by contract. 
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"inoperative." Restatement (Second) § 317 cmt. e ("The rules for promises and other terms of an 
agreement stated in Chapter 8 apply by analogy in determining whether an assignment is 
inoperative on grounds of public policy under paragraph (2)(b) of this Section." (emphasis 
added)). The illustrations set forth in Section 317 demonstrating various inoperative assignments 
also describe them as being ''ineffective." See Restatement (Second) § 317 illus. 7, 8 & 9. Thus, 
as the law is summarized in Corpus Juris Secondum: 
Generally, an assignment is valid if it does not violate any 
statute, public policy, or constitutional provision, but it is invalid if 
it violates express or implied statutory prohibitions or is contrary to 
public policy. Statutory modifications may lend validity to an 
assignment that would be void against public policy at common 
law. 
6A C.J.S. Assignments§ 70 (Feb. 2018 update) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
But although the foregoing secondary authorities and the numerous judicial opinions on 
which they are grounded clearly establish that an assignment of conditional or other rights may 
be ineffective, inoperative, invalid, or void, . not even the outlier opinion discussed and 
distinguished in part A(iv) below held that such an assignment in and of itself"extinguished" the 
underlying rights that were subject to the failed assignment. Furthermore, this Court's precedent 
establishes that Canyon Coves' assignment of the ROFR to Burns Concrete did not "extinguish" 
it. 
In Noeske v. Hiebert, 94 Idaho 143, 483 P.2d 674 (1970), plaintiff Noeske entered into 
conditional sales contracts with non-party "Amos," including a third conditional sales contract 
(the "third contract") that prohibited Amos from "selling, assigning or transferring any rights 
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under the contract" or the property he was purchasing. Id. at 145, 483 P.2d at 676. A few 
months later Amos assigned the third contract to defendant Hiebert without obtaining Noeske's 
"consent to this assignment, either directly or constructively .... " Id. at 146, 483 P.2d at 677. 
And in consideration for such assignment, Hiebert released a chattel mortgage against property 
subject to other conditional sales contracts, which property Noeske later repossessed. Id. at 148, 
483 P.2d at 679. 
Based on the district court's determination that the assignment was void, Hiebert claimed 
"that a failure of consideration on the part of Amos occurred which resulted in the revival of the 
chattel mortgage." Id. This Court held as follows in rejecting Hiebert's claim: 
[I]t cannot successfully be argued that a failure of consideration on 
the part of Amos occurred which resulted in the revival of the 
chattel mortgage. The third contract provided that Amos could not 
assign his rights under the contract without the consent of Noeske, 
and since no consent was given by Noeske, the assignment was 
void as between Noeske and Hiebert, the latter obtaining no rights 
to or under the third contract. The prohibition of an assignment 
was for the benefit of the vendor, Noeske, however, and it in no 
way affected the validity of the assignment as between Amos and 
Hiebert, subject, of course, to Noeske's interest in enforcing the 
prohibition. 
Id. (multiple internal and concluding citations omitted). 
Or as otherwise stated, Hiebert received consideration for the release of his chattel 
mortgage because Amos's rights under the third contract were not "extinguished" by his 
assignment to Hiebert. Therefore, as the ratio decidendi for this Court's foregoing holding and 
the multiple supporting authorities cited by the.Court establish, not even an assignment in direct 
contravention of a contractual prohibition cin assignments renders the underlying contractual 
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rights extinguished in the absence of an express contractual, statutory, or constitutional provision 
requiring such a result. 12 
A review of the ROFR confirms that it contains no prohibition or even limitation on its 
. . . 
assignment by any party. Nor have Plaintiffs or the district court asserted that any statutory or 
constitutional provision dictates that the ROFR was voided by its assignment. Accordingly, and 
contrary to the district court's holding; Canyon Cove's assignment to Burns Concrete did not 
"extinguish" all rights under the ROFR, even if the assignment were held on public-policy 
grounds to be ineffective, inoperative, invalid, or void. 
(iv) Discussion and Analysis of Known Adverse Authority. 
Defendants submit as an initial matter that but one known opinion of any state or federal 
. . 
court has ever held that a right of first refusal is "extinguished" upon the named beneficiary's 
12 See also Restatement (Second) § 322(2), which provides as follows: 
A contract term prohibiting assignment of rights under the 
contract, unless a different intention is manifested, 
* * * 
(b) gives the obligor a right to damages for breach of the 
terms forbidding assignment but does not render the assignment 
ineffective; 
(c) is for the benefit of the obligor, and does not prevent 
the assignee from acquiring rights against the assignor or the 
obligor from discharging his duty as if there were no such 
prohibition. 
(Emphasis added.) Needless to say, if an invalid assignment extinguishes the underlying 
contractual rights, there would be no right that an assignor could assign and there would be no 
duty remaining for an obligor to discharge. 
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(a) invalid assignment of the right to" a third party, or (b) invalid assignment ofthe right to a third 
party in conjunction with conveying other appurtenant property to the third party. Nevertheless, 
Defendants direct this Court's attention to the following cautionary statement in American 
Jurisprudence, Second: 
Caution: 
The right of first refusal may be considered a personal 
contract, and as such, when a right of first refusal is conveyed 
simultaneously with a parcel, the subsequent assignment and 
exercise of the right of first refusal may be void as the right of first 
refusal does not run with the land, but rather is personal to the 
grantee, and thus is extinguished when the property is conveyed. 
6 AM. JUR.2D Assignments § 40 (Feb. 2018 update) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Thus, 
the foregoing cautionary statement both warns that a subsequent assignment and exercise of a 
right of first refusal "may be void" and that a right of first refusal may itself be "extinguished 
when the property is conveyed." The cautionary statement cites a single authority in support of 
its warning: Sniezyk v. Stocker, 729 N.Y.S.2d 264 (N.Y. Sup. 2001), which has never been cited 
by an appellate court. 
In Sniezyk, Stocker had conveyed a parcel of land to non-party Michele Coons and 
granted her a right of first refusal on an adjoining parcel. Coons later conveyed both the parcel 
she purchased and her right of first refusal to Sniezyk. A_ few years later Stocker entered into a 
contract to sell to "Iaia" a portion of the property subject to the right of first refusal and then 
gave Sniezyk notice of the proposed sale before later renouncing the notice on the ground of 
mistake, whereupon Sniezyk filed suit to enforce the right of first refusal he obtained from 
Coons. Id 
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The trial court decided the dispute in favor of the contract purchaser, holding as follows: 
Iaia contends that the right of first refusal was personal to 
Coons ·and the subsequent assignment and exercise of the right of 
first refusal are void. The court agrees. Iaia refers to Adler v. 
Simpson, 203 A.D.2d 691, 610 N.Y.S.2d 351 (3rd Dep't 1994). 
Both here and in Adler, a parcel and a right of first refusal were 
conveyed simultaneously. As the Third Department described 
Adler, the deed conveying the land ''clearly intended such 
conveyance to be binding upon [the grantee] and his successors 
and assigns. The right of first refusal, executed on that same date, 
did not include such language and, had the parties intended that 
result, such could have been accomplished by the inclusion of 
appropriate language." Id. at 692,610 N.Y.S.2d 351. 
Sniezyk, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 264-65 (emphasis added). The court therefore clearly held that both the 
attempted assignment of the right of first refusal by Coons and the attempted exercise of the right 
by Sniezyk were "void," thereby deciding the dispute over whether Sniezyk as the assignee of 
the right of first refusal obtained any enforceable legal rights. 
But after holding the attempted assignment and exercise were void, the court went on to 
explain its holding as follows: 
Here, the land ·was conveyed to Coons "and assigns 
forever". Deed, Iaia Exhibit A. The right of first refusal was 
conveyed to Coons alone. By its language, it did not run with the 
land, but rather was personal to her, and was extinguished when 
she conveyed the property to plaintiffs.[131 See Adler, supra. 
13 Because the court had already held that "the right of first refusal was personal to Coons 
and the subsequent assignment and exercise of the right of first refusal are void[,]" the court's 
subsequent statement that the right of first refusal "was extinguished when [Coons] conveyed the 
property to plaintiffs[]" is mere dictum and not controlling. See, e.g. , State v. Taylor, 157 Idaho 
369, 371, 336 P.3d 302, 304 (Ct. App. 2014). 
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Sniezyk, id. at 265 ( emphasis added). Thus, the sole support given by the court for its ruling that 
the right of first refusal was "extinguished when [Coons] conveyed the property to plaintiffs" 
was a reference to the opinion in Adler v. Simpson. 
The decision in Adler, however, had nothing to do with whether the right of first refusal 
there at issue was extinguished when its named beneficiary conveyed the right and additional 
property owned by the beneficiary· to another party. Rather, the question decided in Adler was 
whether the right of first refusal survived the death of the grantor of the right. For as the court 
there explains: 
In finding that the right of first refusal could not be deemed 
to have run with the land because it would have been violative of 
the Rule Against Perpetuities and the only reasonable construction 
consistent with EPTL 9-1.3 must be that the parties intended it to 
be a personal agreement, binding on themselves only and not their 
successors and assigns, we find, as did County Court, that the first 
refusal agreement was personal to Bedell and was extinguished 
upon his death. 
Adler, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 354 (emphasis added). 
Yet as logical as it may be that a "personal agreement" is "extinguished" upon the death 
of one of the persons making the agreement, the opinion in Adler includes not a word explaining 
why a "personal agreement'' might also be "extinguished" if one of the parties to the agreement 
attempts to make a "void" assignment of the agreement, as was done in Sniezyk v. Stocker. 
Indeed, there is absolutely nothing presented by the opinion in Adler that supports the conclusion 
in Sniezyk that the right of first refusal there at issue "was extinguished when [Coons] conveyed 
the property to plaintiffs." Or in a nutshell, the sole authority cited by the court in Sniezyk for its 
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ruling that the right of first refusal there at issue was "extinguished when [Coons] conveyed the 
property to plaintiffs"-provides no support for the ruling. 
. . 
Nor was the question of what rights were retained by the named beneficiary of the right 
of first refusal after she attempted her "void" assignment even before the court in Sniezyk, as 
Coons was not a party to that litigation. Accordingly, the opinion in Sniezyk simply does not 
decide the question of whether all rights under the ROFR at issue in this lawsuit were 
extinguished when Canyon Cove assigned the ROFR and conveyed its interest in the Purchased 
Property to Bums Concrete. Indeed, and as previously noted, the district court itself ruled that 
Sniezyk was "insufficient to conclude that a personal ROFR is extinguished upon its invalid 
assignment." 2nd MSJ Decision 7 [R, p. 80]. 
(v) Summary of ROFR Argument. 
The law in Idaho relating to the treatment of a right of first refusal for the purchase of 
land as being a personal contract or servitude, or as being appurteriarit to real property, or as 
running with the land has not been addressed by either of Idaho's appellate courts. But no matter 
whether this Court determines the ROFR to be personal to Canyon Cove and/or appurtenant to 
the Purchased Property, the ROFR may yet be exercised in accordance with each of its expressed 
and implied terms if and when notice is given by Plaintiffs of their intent to sell the ROFR 
Property. And for this elemental reason, this Court should reverse the district court's ruling that 
the ROFR was "extinguished" by Canyon Cove's assignment to Bums Concrete. 
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B. The Award Of Plaintiffs' Attorney Fees And Costs Should Be Reversed. 
Notwithstanding the district court's Judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' claims with 
prejudice, the court ruled that Plaintiffs were the prevailing parties in this lawsuit because the 
"Court granted summary judgment to the Plaintiffs, holding that the ROFR was extinguished 
when Canyon Cove assigned it to Burns." Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Attorney Fees 
and Costs, filed July 27, 2017 ("Order on Fees & Costs"), 6 [R, p. 108]. But in the event this 
Court reverses the district court's determination that the ROFR was extinguished, Defendants 
will clearly be the "prevailing party," as such term is contemplated under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) 
and 54(e)(l). In such event, both the district court's determination that Plaintiffs were the 
prevailing parties and its award of Plaintiffs' attorney fees and costs should also be reversed. 
C. Defendants Are Entitled To Their Attorney Fees Incurred On Appeal. 
As the district court found, "[t]he parties agree that this case revolves around a 
commercial transaction," entitling the prevailing parties to attorney fees under Idaho Code 
Section 12-120(3 ). Order on Fees & Costs 8 [R, p. 11 O]. See also Complaint 4 at ~ 16 [R, p. 
11]; Answer 4 at~ 14 [R, p. 38]. Accordingly, in the event this Court reverses the district court's 
determinations that the ROFR was extinguished and that Plaintiffs were the prevailing parties in 
the trial court, together with the award of Plaintiffs' attorney fees and costs, Defendants should 
.. 
be awarded their attorney fees incurred in prosecuting this appeal, as provided by Idaho Code 
Section 12-120(3) and I.A.R. 41. O'Shea v. High Mark Dev., LLC, 153 Idaho 119,132,280 P.3d 
146, 159 (2012) (holding the prevailing party on appeal is entitled to an award of attorney fees 
under 12-120(3) "where the action is cine to recover in a commercial transaction"). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, Defendants request this Court to reverse the district 
court's determination that the ROFR was extinguished and that Plaintiffs were the prevailing 
parties in the proceedings below, together with the award of attorney fees and costs to Plaintiffs, 
and to award Defendants their attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED this 15th day of February 2018. 
BY. ____ -. _ _________ _ 
Robert B. Bt · s 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
-31-
21813.002\4817-7998-8827v3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of February 2018, I caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANTS' BRIEF to be served by the method indicated 
below and addressed to the following: 
Donald F. Carey 
Lindsey R. Romankiw 
Carey Romankiw, PLLC 
980 Pier View Drive, Suite B 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402-2913 
Fax: (208) 525-8813 
21813.002\4817-7998-8827v3 
~ U.S. Mail 
D Facsimile 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Delivery 
D Email: dfc@careyromankiw.com 
. · care romankiw.com 
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UNDIVIDED RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL 
TO ACQUIRE INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY 
This Right of First Refusal is made and entered into as of the \Ch day of March, 
1999, by and between Theodore E. Mulberry and Nora A. Mulberry, husband and wife, as 
Sellers, and Canyon Cove Development Company, LLP, as Buyers. 
WITNESSETH 
1. For adequate consideration, Sellers hereby grant to the Buyer a right of first 
refusal to acquire the Sellers' undivided interest in and to the real property hereafter desclibed 
on the same terms, conditions, and provisions as the Sellers might intend to sell and convey 
said interest to any third person hereafter. 
2. Should the Sellers hereafter intend to sell in good faith and convey said 
premises they will first offer the same to the Buyer by a written notice containing all of the 
terms, conditions, and provisions by which they intend to sell in good faith the same to said 
third person. Buyer shall then have five (5) days from the date such notice is received to 
accept or refuse said offer. 
3. Should the Buyer decline the offer, and the sale to the third party, for any 
reason not occur, then this option of first refusal should then be renewed and shall apply to 
any subsequent sale to a third party. 
4. Shall Buyer fail or refuse to accept any such offer within their time limit stated, 
then any interest of Buyer in the subject property shall cease and terminate as to the sale to 
the intended third party should it occur. This option agreement may be recorded in 
Bonneville County, Idaho. Thereafter, Sellers may record a notice in Bonneville County, 
Idaho_, shO\ving the date on which tli..:,y gavt;; their notic,~ to Buyers, in order to give record 
notice of the beginning of the stated notice time period. 
5. The real property to which this option of first refusal applies is located in 
Bonneville County and is described as follows: 
Sellers' right, title and interest in and to: 
Beginning at a point 25 feet West and 1776.28 feet South of the 
Northeast corn er of Section 15, in Township 1 North, Range 3 7 
East of the Boise Meridian, thence continuing South paralleling 
the East line of said Section 15, 888.72 feet, more or less, to the 
EXHIBIT 
A 
27 
Southeast comer of the N.E. 1/4 of said Section 15; thence West 
2895 feet to a point in the East line of the Oregon Short Line 
Railroad right of way, thence Northeasterly along said right of 
way line 1024.6 feet, thence in an Easterly direction 2483.7 feet 
to the place of beginning. ALSO: Beginning at a point 25 feet 
South and 25 feet West of the Northeast corner of Section 15, 
Township I North, Range 37 East of the Boise Meridiani thence 
South 1751.28 feet, paralleling Section line between Sections 14 
and 15, thence right angles to said Section line and West 24 83. 7 
feet to a point in the East line of the Oregbn Short Line Railroad 
right of way; thence Northeasterly along said right of way line 
2091 feet; thence East and parallel to North line of Section 15, 
1496 feet to the place of beginning. 
SUBJECT TO: 
a. General taxes for the year 1999 and all slibsequent years. 
b. These premises are situated within the boundaries of the Idaho 
Irrigation District and are subject to the assessments thereof for the year 
1999 and all subsequent years. 
c . All easements and rights-of-way of record or those appearing on the 
land which affect the described property. 
d. Patent reservations, mineral, oil, gravel, and other reservations, all 
building codes, laws, and zoning ordinances affecting the described 
premises. 
Dated this _ft date of March, 1999 . 
. /~ ~~~/., < ,?3fc<C6J!?... 4~'2,-t£~., ~--... 
Theodore E. Mulberry / 
)'- . z 
~, hu/ l. 
No{·a A. Mulberry 
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ST ATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss . 
County of Bonneville ) 
CANYON co~ DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, I , · 
' -✓ 
' / i 
B\_ .. : · / /Jl1/ ltl- tl~/(~,,-~-. 
C> ' 
Linda Wilkins, Managing Partner 
On the ~~ay of March, 1999, before me, the undersigned, a notary public in and 
for said State, personally appeared Theodore E. Mulberry and Nora A. Mulberry, husband 
and wife, known or identified to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the 
within instrnment and acknowledged to me that they executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal , 
the day and year in this certificate first aboYe written. 
3 -
(seal) 
-=-,w;::,;:.,;:_,,.;.r~ ... - ; r .. ~AAYPUBLIC 
! ~~-~4:~fz/i~Tf?- .. -·-
'&.: .. ~.t.:;t,.;. • • · • ..e ' •• , ~ ...... - , .. . , 
~H!',• ,·,11 • .. ~ , , ,,; ,:H 1·1 • ~ 
~: (.<.,t 11 d H!J~i1. al( i.1:..; t' ij'.: 
Notary Public for Idah'o' 
Residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho . _ 
My Commission Expires: \. \Q\i \MCJ:\ 
lr·JSTRUMENl NO. _/!?/_~ 
DArF. ____1.t..::::./ 'f_;.!J;.!j _ 
tt-JST. CODE ____ -~- Cf ,Cf -~f_ - ~ 
IM NJ l: D PGS _ _ f ·--· 
FEE __ _ __ /oc_-__ 
i,rATF o~: IDAt~O ) I (;()l,;•1: • Y· '.'.-.-.-- ':; :1·_-. ,~1 ..E) $S I. l ·-•,-. , -.,,,. •:··:!-: ,·•._; ,·, :,t Iha within 
•n:11' · ·•· ·,,··· ,v,,:,, 1ocon10d. 
j :-ic,• · · ~- •· ,grnori.:i, 
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STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
On the \i-\k\ day of March, l 999, before me the undersigned, a notary public in and 
for said State, personally appeared Linda Wilkins, known or identified to me to be one of the 
partners in the partnership of Canyon Cove Development Company, LLP, and the partner or 
one of the partners who subscribed said partnership name to the foregoing instrument, and 
acknowledged to me that she executed the same in said partnership name. 
IN WllNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal 
the day and year in this certificate first above written. 
(seal) 
G:\WPDATA\GLMI 1700\CANCOV.IU'll:os 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: \ \ s;b ~ \¢:it>C):S 
I I 
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